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Abstract
We study the disposition decision for product returns in a closed-loop supply chain. Moti-
vated by the asset recovery process at IBM, we consider two disposition alternatives. Returns
may be either refurbished for reselling or dismantled for spare parts. Reselling a refurbished
unit typically yields higher unit margins. However, demand is uncertain. A common policy in
many firms is to rank disposition alternatives by unit margins. We show that a revenue man-
agement approach to the disposition decision which explicitly incorporates demand uncertainty
can increase profits significantly. We discuss analogies between the disposition problem and
the classical airline revenue management problem. We then develop single period and multi-
period stochastic optimization models for the disposition problem. Analyzing these models,
we show that the optimal allocation balances expected marginal profits across the disposition
alternatives. A detailed numerical study reveals that a revenue management approach to the
disposition problem significantly outperforms the current practice of focusing exclusively on
high-margin options, and we identify conditions under which this improvement is the highest.
We also show that the value recovered from the returned products critically depends on the
coordination between forward and reverse supply chain decisions.
Keywords: Remanufacturing, Revenue Management, Spare Parts Inventory
1 Introduction
Revenue management is concerned with selling the right amount of product or capacity to the
right customer at the right time. In this paper, we consider a firm’s optimal disposition decision
for product returns—remanufacture or dismantle for spare parts—from a revenue management
perspective. In our case, the capacity to be allocated is the returned units which can be either
remanufactured or dismantled for spare parts. We model this problem in a multi-period, finite
horizon setting, which addresses the importance of timing in these decisions.
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Our problem is motivated by the asset recovery process at IBM. Information technology prod-
ucts such as personal computers, servers, storage systems, and mainframes coming off of lease are
returned to IBM’s remanufacturing facility where a disposition decision—remanufacture or disman-
tle for spare parts—is made. Because the required amount of processing for electronic equipment
is much less than in other industries such as automotive engines, we use the terms remanufacturing
and refurbishing synonymously in this paper (the term refurbishing is often used for “light” reman-
ufacturing). The remanufacturing operation involves replacing all wearable components, testing,
cleaning, and reloading of software to create a standard configuration. Remanufactured units are
advertised on IBM’s web site (www.ibm.com) for about one month and, if not sold during this time,
are salvaged to third-party brokers through an auction. While remanufactured units sold via the
web site command attractive margins, unsold units salvaged via the auction can, in most cases, only
recover the cost incurred for remanufacturing. Thus, IBM makes a high profit on remanufactured
units sold through its regular web site channel, and close to zero profit on remanufactured units
that do not sell within the one month window and must be salvaged via the auction.
Instead of remanufacturing a returned unit, IBM can dismantle it to harvest non-wearable
parts, such as memory, video cards, and mother boards, which can be used as spare parts for
service repairs, or even for selling to customers. The traditional approach for managing spare parts
consists of purchasing new parts from the regular supplier as needed. Moreover, suppliers of new
parts (e.g., Intel) often have strong incentives to terminate regular production for parts that face
slowing demand, such as after the product has been taken out of the market, and may demand a
“final buy” from the manufacturer (Cattani and Souza 2003). In that case, the manufacturer often
buys a large quantity of parts to last through the period for which it has service contracts. Since
demand for spare parts is uncertain during that long period, the firm may run out of inventory and,
if the original supplier no longer offers the part, has to procure the part at an alternative supplier
(e.g., distributors specializing in hard-to-find parts) at a substantially higher cost. The dismantling
decision offers flexibility to meet demand for spare parts in a less expensive way when there are
shortages.
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When a returned unit arrives at IBM’s asset recovery facility, a disposition decision must be
made to either remanufacture the unit, to dismantle it for spare parts, or to scrap it for material
recycling. In general, remanufacturing and reselling a unit via the web site is more profitable than
dismantling the returned unit for parts, which is more profitable than scrapping it. The current
practice is to base this decision primarily on unit margins and on product quality. For products that
are in a good technical condition, remanufacturing is currently always prioritized over dismantling.
In this paper, we argue that the disposition problem described above is essentially a revenue-
management problem. Multiple recovery channels compete for a limited amount of high-quality
returned units or cores. In addition to unit margins, the chances of actually selling a unit through
a given channel drives this decision. Because prices for remanufactured units sold via the web
site are market driven and face restrictions on their range from the new products sales force (to
minimize canibalization), IBM faces demand uncertainty— rather than price uncertainty—for units
remanufactured. Due to this uncertainty, dismantling for parts can be an attractive alternative,
despite its lower unit margins. This option is particularly valuable if the inventory for spare parts
is low relative to demand. Dismantling also faces a lower penalty for overproduction because spare
parts can be carried in inventory until the end of the service period, which can be many months or
even years. The disposition decision has to balance all these factors.
The concept of weighing the opportunity cost of a higher margin, but more uncertain, future
demand versus a more certain, but lower margin, present demand is not new. Airlines, hotels, and
rental car agencies have been weighing this trade-off for over twenty years using techniques originally
referred to as yield management and today, more commonly referred to as revenue management
(see Cross 1997 for an entertaining history of the field). The basic idea behind revenue management
is to determine how many units of capacity to sell to lower margin customers that are requesting
the product today versus how many units to reserve for higher margin customers that may arrive
in the future. In the airline industry, customers are typically segmented into leisure and business
segments. The leisure segment customers have a lower willingness to pay for a flight but are willing
to pay for their seat well in advance of the departure date. The business customers often request
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seats close to the departure date and are willing to pay a higher price for this added convenience.
While this is a major simplification of the actual problem, it captures the airline’s main trade-off of
how many seats to reserve for future business class customers given a demand of leisure customers
that exceeds the seat capacity of the plane. Assuming lower margin customers arrive before higher
margin customers, an optimal allocation is to sell to the lower value customers until the marginal
opportunity cost (of missing future potential higher margin demand) exceeds the benefit from
selling to the lower margin customer. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) provide an extensive review
of the revenue management techniques and algorithms used in practice and/or appearing in the
literature.
To link the basic revenue management problem back to IBM’s disposition decision regarding
a returned unit, consider the spare parts demand as the lower paying customer and the potential
sell of a remanufactured unit as a higher paying customer. Each arrival of a returned unit to
the asset recovery facility is similar to a low margin customer requesting a seat on an airline.
At each returned unit arrival, IBM must decide whether to dismantle the unit for spare parts,
if current parts inventory is low, and receive a more certain low margin or to remanufacture the
product in hopes of achieving a higher margin in the future by selling it through its web site. If
the remanufactured unit does not sell through the web site during the four-week time window,
the product is salvaged through an auction at a price roughly equal to the cost incurred for the
remanufacturing operation. The additional value added to the product through the remanufacturing
process is typically greater than the value obtained from dismantling the unit for spare parts, thus
it is more profitable to salvage the remanufactured units that did not sell on the web site via the
auction rather than dismantle the remanufactured units for spare parts. In other words, it is only
profitable to dismantle the returned unit for parts before it undergoes the (costly) remanufacturing
process. It is, however, more profitable to dismantle the returned unit, if parts inventory is low,
than to remanufacture it and end up not selling it via the web site. Therefore, a remanufactured
unit that does not sell via the web site represents the same missed opportunity cost as an empty
seat on an airplane (upon departure) that the airline chose not to sell to a low margin customer in
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hopes that a higher paying customer would buy it instead.
1.1 Contribution to the Literature
The key contribution of this paper is to show how a revenue management approach to the disposition
decision can significantly increase profitability. In more specific terms, we make the following
contributions:
• We point out that the disposition decision in a closed-loop supply chain has many of the same
characteristics as a traditional revenue management problem, even though the operational
context of both problems is quite different.
• We develop and solve a stochastic optimization model for the disposition problem and char-
acterize the optimal policy.
• We assess the financial value of the dismantling option. We find that excluding dismantling
from the set of dispositions, by always prioritizing the high-margin remanufacturing option,
decreases the firm’s profit by 20% on average. This shows that an additional disposition
option can significantly improve the profitability of a closed-loop supply chain, even if it has
lower unit margins.
• Given the complexity of the optimal disposition policy, we investigate the performance of
simpler heuristics. We find that allocating returns to remanufacturing and dismantling on
the basis of their mean demands (net of inventory) performs reasonably well, relative to the
optimal policy, with an average profit deterioration of only 4%. However, we also find that the
value of dismantling is critically dependent on the coordination between forward and reverse
supply chain decisions. Specifically, we show that the value of dismantling drops by about
60% if the final-buy decision does not appropriately anticipate future streams of returns and
their disposition. This reinforces the view that firms should make their operating decisions
as an integrated closed-loop supply chain rather than as separate forward and reverse chains.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In §2, we position our research in the context of
the relevant literature. In §3, we list our key assumptions and notation, present our model and
provide some analytic results. In §4, we present numerical results on the value of dismantling from
a study based on realistic parameter values. In §5, we summarize our results and conclude with
managerial implications. All proofs are provided in Appendix A.
2 Literature Review
Our research draws on two separate streams of literature: revenue management and remanufac-
turing. In this section, we provide a review of the prominent research in each stream and position
our research at the point of their intersection. We begin with an overview of the relevant revenue
management literature.
In the past two decades, revenue management has grown into a vast area of research with ap-
plications in numerous fields, notably in the service sector. The literature on the use of revenue
management in a manufacturing setting has mainly focused on customer segments who are hetero-
geneous on their willingness to wait for a product and is split between make-to-order (MTO) and
make-to-stock (MTS) environments. Research on firms who provide a MTO service has typically
focused on capacitated systems where the firm provides discounts based on advance purchase, lead-
time, and delivery time flexibility. Other proposed options include some type of admissions control
policy where low margin orders may be declined, or quoted a longer lead-time, in anticipation of
higher margin orders that may arrive in the future. Most of the work in this area models the
manufacturing environment as a capacitated queueing system. A review of this literature can be
found in Keskinocak and Tayur (2004). For MTS environments, the majority of the research has
focused on inventory management policies that include rationing, where a portion of the inventory
is reserved for higher margin customers who may arrive in the future. Topkis (1968), Ha (1997),
Deshpande et al. (2003), and Zhao et al. (2005) provide a representative sample of the research in
this area. The main difference between these two research streams and our paper is that our focus
is on what type of product to produce (harvest for spare parts versus remanufacture for resell as a
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complete product) while, in the literature streams described above, the physical characteristics of
the product is the same for all customers but the customer waiting times differ.
The literature on remanufacturing is part of a broader stream of research on reusable resources,
which has been gaining significant momentum over the past decade. The recovery of value from
used products and materials has triggered the emergence of ‘reverse’ supply chains, performing
the acquisition and collection of returned goods, their inspection, grading, and disposition, repro-
cessing operations, such as remanufacturing and recycling, and the remarketing of the processed
goods (Guide and Van Wassenhove, 2003). Collectively, these processes link markets that return
certain products to new markets for these products. Reverse logistics is concerned with the physical
flows through this link (Dekker at al., 2003). Key commercial decisions concern price, quantity,
and quality both on the acquisition and on the reselling side (Guide and Van Wassenhove, 2001).
Literature on quantitative approaches to these decisions is still relatively scarce. Guide et al. (2003)
jointly optimize acquisition and sales prices, taking into account product quality variations. Gal-
breth and Blackburn (2006) address the interaction between acquisition quantity and quality. Ray
et al. (2005) analyze optimal trade-in rebates. On the sales side, several authors have addressed the
interaction between new production and remanufacturing, using game-theoretic analyses (e.g. Debo
et al. 2005; Ferrer and Swaminathan, 2006; Ferguson and Toktay, 2006).
The disposition decision in the reverse supply chain allocates returned products to an appro-
priate processing option. In the simplest case, disposition options include a form of recovery, e.g.
remanufacturing, and disposal. A richer setting may include several alternative recovery options,
such as remanufacturing, harvesting of parts, and material recycling. Most research contributions,
as well as business examples, address the disposition decision by means of a relatively long-term
priority ranking, typically based on contribution margins. This approach assigns a returned prod-
uct to the highest ranked option that is technically feasible, given the physical product status
(Fleischmann et al., 2004). An exception is Guide et al. (2007), who link the disposition decision
to the occupancy rate of the remanufacturing facility; thereby avoiding excessive processing delays.
In this study, we propose that disposition decisions may benefit from a dynamic approach that
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takes into account short-term variations in commercial opportunities. Two main factors drive our
argument, namely demand uncertainty and depreciation. Guide et al. (2006) highlight depreciation
as a key issue in closed-loop supply chains and analyze its impact on supply chain design. We address
its influence on the short-term disposition decisions. This situation is analogous to classical airline
revenue management, where discount decisions depend dynamically on the number of remaining
empty seats and on the time until departure. To date, very few articles in the literature apply
a revenue management approach to disposition decisions in closed-loop supply chains. The paper
that is closes to our analysis is Inderfurth et al. (2001), which investigates the allocation of returned
products to multiple alternative reuse options, given stochastic demand and return volumes. The
authors analyze the optimal policy structure and calculate optimal control parameters under the
assumption of a linear allocation of shortages. We do not make this assumption and instead
investigate how to allocate scarce returns—and thereby also shortages—to the different channels
so as to maximize profit. Kleber et al. (2002) analyze a related deterministic model and derive
optimal disposition rules under time-varying return and demand volumes. In contrast to their
analysis, our disposition strategy is driven by expected opportunity costs, rather than by seasonal
fluctuations. Finally, we mention two papers that propose price-based revenue management in
a closed-loop supply chain. Mitra (2007) determines optimal prices in a stochastic single-period
model with multiple reuse options and Gayon and Dallery (2007) compare static and dynamic
pricing strategies in a stochastic infinite-horizon model. In contrast to both of these models, our
analysis focuses on quantity-based revenue management where the firm’s decisions involve the
allocation of returned products to alternative reuse options with exogenous prices.
3 Model Formulation and Analysis
3.1 Key Assumptions
Motivated by the context introduced in Section 1, we consider the situation of a firm that receives
recoverable products returned from the market. The firm has two options for recovering value from
these returns, namely remanufacturing or dismantling for parts. The firm seeks to allocate the
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returned products to these options so as to maximize expected profits. To model this disposition
problem we make a number of assumptions, some of which are specific to our remanufacturing
environment, that we discuss below.
Assumption 1 The arrival of returned units is exogenous to the decision maker.
There are cases where the decision maker in charge of making the disposition decision can
influence the timing and quantity of returned units by offering a higher acquisition price (Guide
et al. 2003). In the case of IBM, however, the majority of the returned units arriving at the
remanufacturing facility are end-of-lease returns. The average age is three years from the original
manufacture of the product. Because the leases are originally written by the sales force for the new
products division, the manager in charge of handling product returns has little influence on the
volume and timing of the returned units. This scenario is common for companies that lease their
products.
Assumption 2 The prices charged for the remanufactured units are exogenous to the decision
maker’s problem and constant over the planning horizon.
Consider again the case at IBM. Because new products are also sold in the remanufactured
products’s channel (i.e., IBM’s web site), the remanufactured units are restricted from being priced
below a set percentage of the price for the new products in the same product category. This is
done to minimize the cannibalization effect of the remanufactured units on the sales of the new
units. There are also brand image concerns that limit IBM from pricing the remanufactured units
at a market clearing price. The third party vendors that purchase the unsold (after four weeks on
the web site) remanufactured units via the auction agree to sell the units in secondary markets to
minimize the cannibalization and negative brand image effects. For these reasons, the prices for
remanufactured units made available on the web site are typically set well in advance and are not
changed based on the volume or current sales rate of the remanufactured units. Thus, exogenously
determined remanufactured prices are a reasonable assumption in our context.
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Assumption 3 Remanufactured units can only be sold during a limited time period. Leftover units
at the end of this period are salvaged.
This assumption is related to the previous one. Given pricing inflexibility, a finite selling
period counterbalances product depreciation, which is substantial for electronic products, and clears
inventory.
Assumption 4 Unsatisfied demand for spare parts entails a per-unit penalty cost which is constant
over time.
This assumption is true for the majority of the spare parts. Once a product’s demand slows,
suppliers typically require a final buy for their components, so as to free valuable capacity for more
current (and higher demand) components. The firm thus makes a final buy purchase for each part
to meet warranty and contractual repair needs for the remaining life of the product. We consider
the firm’s situation after this final buy. If the firm runs out of inventory for a part during that
period, the firm must procure the part at an alternative, considerably more expensive supplier
(e.g., distributors specialized in “hard to find” components). The price of the component from
these third-party suppliers are typically constant over time.
Assumption 5 The per unit cost to remanufacture a returned unit is constant across all units.
This assumption may seem counter to the claims of other recent work, which states that reman-
ufacturing cost per unit depends on a returned unit’s quality (and it is thus not constant across
all units). Indeed, at IBM, returned units arrive with various quality levels and thus, the costs
associated with bringing the units up to the quality level of the standard configuration needed for
resale also vary. What makes this assumption reasonable in our model is the fact that IBM (and
other firms in the IT industry) only consider the highest quality returns for remanufacturing. A
laptop with a cracked external case, for example, is too costly to remanufacture and is thus screened
out after an initial inspection. Therefore, all units considered for remanufacturing have roughly the
same quality level and, thus, the same per unit cost. In other industries where remanufacturing
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is more labor intensive, and there are more wearable mechanical components, this assumption is
not likely to hold. Instead, total remanufacturing cost should be convex increasing in the quantity
(Ferguson et al. 2008). Our analysis concerns the returns that qualify for remanufacturing in terms
of their quality. There may be additional lower quality returns that are too expensive to profitably
remanufacture but can still be used for parts harvesting. We consider the demand for parts net of
this inflow.
3.2 Single Period Analysis
Table 1: Model Notation
Decision Variables
Qr number of products to be remanufactured
Qd number of products to be dismantled
Random Variables
R number of products returned ∼ FR
Dr demand for remanufactured products ∼ Fr
Did demand for part i from dismantling ∼ F id, with mean µi
Parameters
ai number of parts of type i per returned unit
cr unit remanufacturing cost
cd unit dismantling cost
pr unit sales price for remanufactured product
pii penalty of not meeting demand for part i
v unit salvage value for remanufactured unit not sold
We begin our analysis with a single period model. Table 1 lists our notation. Using the
assumptions outlined above, the disposition problem can then be formalized as follows. At the
beginning of the period, the firm receives R returns. Of these, the firm decides upon the number
of units to be remanufactured Qr, and the number of units to be dismantled Qd. The remainder
units, R − Qr − Qd, are scrapped at a cost normalized to zero. Remanufactured returns that are
not sold are salvaged at a unit value of v. Demand for part i that is not met is assessed a unit
penalty cost pii, which is the (higher) cost of obtaining the part through an alternative supplier.
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Figure 1: Basic Single Period Model
This setting is illustrated in Figure 1. The firm maximizes its one-period expected profit Π:
max
Qr+Qd≤R
Π = E
[
(pr − v) min{Dr, Qr}+ (v − cr)Qr −
∑
i
pii(Did −min{Did, aiQd})
]
− cdQd. (1)
Considering that E[min{D,Q}] = Q− ∫ Q0 F (u)du, where F (·) is the cdf of D, (1) becomes:
max
Qr+Qd≤R
Π = (pr − v)
(
Qr −
∫ Qr
0
Fr(u)du
)
+ (v − cr)Qr
−
∑
i
[
piiµi − pii
(
aiQd −
∫ aiQd
0
F id(u)du
)]
− cdQd. (2)
The optimal solution of this problem is described in Lemma 1 below:
Lemma 1 Let
Πd(Q) =
∑
i
piiai
(
1− F id(aiQ)
)− cd
Πr(Q) = (pr − v) (1− Fr(Q)) + v − cr.
Denote by Q˜d, and Q˜r the solutions to Πd(Q) = 0 and Πr(Q) = 0, respectively. Further, denote by
Qˆd, the solution to Πd(Q) = Πr(R−Q). Then, the optimal solution to the disposition problem (2)
is
(Q∗d, Q
∗
r) =

(min{R, Q˜d}, 0) if Πd(R) > Πr(0),
(0,min{R, Q˜r}) if Πd(0) < Πr(R),
(min{Q˜d, Qˆd},min{Q˜r, R− Qˆd}) else .
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Figure 2: Structure of the Optimal Disposition Policy
In essence, Lemma 1 indicates that if there are enough returns, the firm can satisfy demand
for dismantling and remanufacturing at the levels Q˜d and Q˜r, respectively, that set the marginal
profit of dismantling and remanufacturing equal to zero. Otherwise, the firm sets the optimal
level of dismantling such that the marginal profit of dismantling is equal to the marginal profit of
remanufacturing.
Figure 2 illustrates this optimal disposition policy. As in traditional revenue management
problems, the optimal decision is determined by the expected marginal contributions, which is
intuitive. Unlike in the traditional case however, the optimal decision is not a critical-level policy,
in which the quantity available for the low-value channel equals the amount exceeding a certain
threshold. This is due to the fact that in the disposition problem, demand in both channels is
uncertain.
To illustrate this effect, we consider the special case that demand for parts is deterministic, and
equal across parts. Corollary 1 shows that the optimal disposition policy is a critical-level policy
in this case.
Corollary 1 Assume that Did = dd w.p. 1, for all i. Let pi =
∑
i aipi
i and assume that pi− cd > 0.
Then the optimal remanufacturing and dismantling quantities satisfy:
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(Q∗d, Q
∗
r) =
 (R−min{R, Qˇr},min{R, Qˇr}) if R ≤ dd + Qˇr,(dd,min{Q˜r, R− dd}) else ,
where Qˇr = F−1r
(
1− cr−v−pi+cdpr−v
)
and Q˜r is as defined in Lemma 1.
As in the general case, the firm determines the optimal amounts of remanufacturing and dismantling
by comparing the expected marginal profits of both options. In this deterministic case, however,
the marginal profit of dismantling is constant and equal to pi − cd, for a quantity up to dd. Qˇr
denotes the remanufacturing quantity for which the expected marginal profit equals the marginal
dismantling profit. Note that Qˇr is independent of R and is obtained as a newsvendor solution.
This is the amount which is protected for the “high-margin customers”, i.e. for remanufacturing.
Any returns in excess of this quantity are available for dismantling, up to a maximum quantity of
dd. Any remaining returns will again be remanufactured, as long as the expected marginal profit
remains positive.
We conclude this section be considering another special case that approximates IBM’s situation.
At IBM, the salvage value of unsold remanufactured units v is approximately equal to the remanu-
facturing cost cr. If v = cr, there exists an optimal solution where returns are either dismantled or
remanufactured (i.e., none are scrapped). The reason is because scrapping a returned unit incurs
a profit of zero; all units that are remanufactured but not sold via the website also incur a profit
of zero if v = cr. Thus, if v = cr, there is no risk in remanufacturing “extra” returns, even for very
small probabilities that they will be sold through the website. We formalize this result in Corollary
2 below.
Corollary 2 If v = cr, then there exists an optimal solution to (2) for which Q∗d +Q
∗
r = R.
3.3 Multi-Period Analysis
In many examples, such as at IBM, the period during which a firm offers a repair service, and
thus requires spare parts, is much longer than the period during which a returned unit can be
sold—typically many months or years versus a few weeks. Firms also typically receive multiple
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batches of returns during this service period. To capture the dynamics of this situation, we extend
our disposition model to a multi-period setting.
The periods are interconnected through the inventory level of spare parts. Any units that are
dismantled feed the parts inventory, which is used to meet demand for the parts. If demand for
parts exceeds the available inventory, the firm has to procure parts from an expensive backup
supplier, as discussed in the single-period analysis. Intuitively, the disposition decision depends on
the initial parts inventory level and thereby on the final-buy decision. We therefore include the
final-buy decision in our analysis.
We formalize the multi-period disposition problem as follows. For ease of notation we assume
that there is only one recoverable part per return, i.e. a1=1. Our results extend to the more
general case but the notation becomes cumbersome. We consider a planning horizon of T periods.
Periods are numbered backwards, such that period t indicates there are t periods until the end of
the planning horizon. At the beginning of period t, the firm observes It, the starting inventory for
spare parts, and Rt, the incoming returns in that period. The firm then decides upon the number
of returns to remanufacture Qr,t and to dismantle Qd,t. Demand for remanufactured units Dr,t
and for spare parts Dd,t is realized. Demand for remanufactured products not met is lost; unsold
remanufactured products are salvaged at a unit value v. Demand for spare parts not met from
inventory is met through an alternative supplier at a cost pi per unit; left over inventory for spare
parts is carried over to period t − 1 at a holding cost of h per unit. Any left over spare parts at
time t = 0 have zero salvage value.
At the start of the planning horizon T , the firm makes a final-buy decision, at a cost of c per
part, that brings its inventory of spare parts to IT . The firm aims to maximize expected discounted
profits through the planning horizon, given a one-period discount factor α.
This problem can be formulated as a finite-horizon Markov decision process (MDP) as follows.
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The state variable is It, the actions are Qd,t and Qr,t, and the one period profit for t ≥ 1 is:
Πt(It, Qd,t, Qr,t) = (pr − v)
(
Qr,t −
∫ Qr,t
0
Fr(u)du
)
+ (v − cr)Qr,t
−cdQd,t − piµd + pi(It +Qd,t)− (h+ pi)
∫ (It+Qd,t)
0
Fd(u)du. (3)
The state transition is defined by It−1 = (It +Qd,t −Dd,t)+. For It ≥ 0, the Bellman recursion of
this MDP therefore reads:
Vt(It) = ERt
[
max
Qd,t+Qr,t≤Rt
(
Πt(It, Qd,t, Qr,t) + α
∫ ∞
0
Vt−1((It +Qd,t − u)+)fd(u)du
)]
, (4)
with boundary condition V0 ≡ 0. Recursion (4) provides the disposition decision in each period,
given a starting value for inventory. The final buy decision is made at the beginning of period T ,
and thus
V ∗T = max
IT
{−cIT + VT (IT )}. (5)
The solution of the above MDP has a similar structure and interpretation as in the single-period
case. The marginal contributions of both disposition alternatives drive the allocation decision.
What is different here is that one also has to take into account the impact on future periods
through the resulting inventory level. In addition, the interplay between disposition and final-buy
adds another layer to the problem. The essential property that drives the structure of the optimal
policy is concavity of the value function in the inventory state variable. We summarize this result
in the following theorem
Theorem 1 For any t ≥ 1 the MDP defined in (3) and (4) satisfies the following properties:
(i) Vt(I) is concave in I.
(ii) Wt(It, Qd,t, Qr,t) := Πt(It, Qd,t, Qr,t) + α
∫∞
0 Vt−1((It + Qd,t − u)+)fd(u)du is jointly concave
in It, Qd,t and Qr,t.
(iii) Let
Πd,t(I,Q) = −(h+ pi)Fd(I +Q) + α
∫ I+Q
0
V ′t−1(I +Q− u)fd(u)du− cd + pi (6)
Πr(Q) = (pr − v) (1− Fr(Q))) + v − cr, (7)
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where V ′t is the first-order derivative of Vt. Denote by Q˜d,t, and Q˜r,t, respectively, the solutions
to Πd,t(It, Q˜d,t) = 0 and Πr(Q˜r,t) = 0. Further, denote by Qˆd,t, the solution to Πd,t(It, Qˆd,t) =
Πr(R− Qˆd,t). Then, the optimal solution to (4) is
(Q∗d,t, Q
∗
r,t) =

(min{R, Q˜d,t}, 0) if Πd,t(It, R) > Πr(0),
(0,min{R, Q˜r,t}) if Πd,t(It, 0) < Πr(R),
(min{Q˜d,t, Qˆd,t},min{Q˜r,t, R− Qˆd,t}) else .
(8)
The optimal disposition policy has the same structure as in the single-period case. However,
the marginal benefit of dismantling (i.e. Πd,t) now depends on the spare parts inventory level. Note
from (6) that an additional unit of inventory shifts the dismantling marginal profit curve in Figure
2 to the left by one unit. This also shifts the intersection point of both marginal profit curves to
the left, but not necessarily by a full unit. Therefore, the optimal policy is not a critical-level policy
that replenishes the parts inventory up to a certain fixed target level.
Note further that as a consequence of the concavity of VT , the optimal final-buy quantity I∗T
can be found through a simple myopic search for the maximum.
4 Numerical Results
In this section, we conduct a detailed numerical analysis to assess the performance of our revenue
management approach to product disposition and compare it to other approaches found in practice
or in the literature. Our objective is (i) to gain further insight into the characteristics of our revenue
management approach and the factors that drive it; and (ii) to determine under which conditions
our approach significantly outperforms the other policies and when, on the contrary, a simpler
heuristic will suffice.
4.1 Experimental Design
We consider a planning horizon with T = 10 periods, where each period corresponds to one month.
Returns arrive randomly in each period according to a Poisson process with the mean scaled to
µR = 10 (it may be helpful to think of one unit in this analysis as, say, 1000 units in real life). We
consider the simpler case where there is only one recoverable part per return (a1 = 1); this can be
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thought of as an “aggregate” part. We normalize the remanufactured product’s price to pr = 1000.
The unit cost of purchasing a spare part at the beginning of the planning horizon through the final
buy is c = 100, or 10% of the remanufactured product’s price; this is a realistic number based on our
discussions with IBM. The one-period discount factor is α = 0.99, corresponding to an annual cost
of capital of 12%; we have experimented with other reasonable discount factors and concluded that
they do not impact our results. Finally, we assume v = cr, which is in line with IBM’s situation.
We ran a full-factorial experimental design for the remaining parameters of our model. Each
factor in the experimental design, a parameter of the model, is explored at three levels: low,
medium and high. These levels were chosen based on observed industrial practice as justified
below. The total average demand for spare parts and remanufactured products is expressed as
a fraction 1/k of the average number of returns per period: k(µr + µd) = µR. We choose k ∈
{0.8, 1.0, 1.2}, corresponding to cases when the average returns per period are: insufficient to meet
the average total demand (k = 0.8), equal to average total demand (k = 1), and larger than
average total demand (k = 1.2). Regarding the mix of demand between remanufactured products
and spare parts, we assume the demand for spare parts in each period follows a Poisson distribution,
with its mean expressed as a fraction of the mean for remanufactured products µdµr ∈ {0.5, 1, 2};
corresponding to reasonable low, medium and high values found in practice. We consider that
demand for remanufactured products follows a normal distribution with mean µr and a coefficient of
variation CVr ∈ {0.1, 0.4, 0.7}, corresponding to low, medium and high levels of demand variability.
Remanufacturing cost per unit relative to price crpr is set at low, medium and high levels of 0.1,
0.4, and 0.7, respectively. These choices are justified as follows: Agrawal et al. (2008) report values
for crpr in the range 0.05-0.20 for commercial IT equipment; Hauser and Lund (2003) report average
values of crpr in the range 0.45-0.65 for industries where remanufacturing is more labor intensive (and
thus remanufacturing is more expensive). Dismantling cost cd should be lower than c, otherwise
dismantling for spare parts is not economically attractive and our problem is not interesting. We
therefore varied cdc over a wide range between 0.1 and 0.7 to reflect the possible values found in
practice. Similarly, the cost of meeting demand for spare parts with the alternative supplier pi
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should be higher than c, otherwise the problem is not interesting. We thus choose values of pic in
the range 1.5-4.5, to reflect a wide range of scenarios. Finally, considering that a period in our
study is one month, hc can be thought of as the monthly holding cost on a percentage basis. We
choose values between 0.01 and 0.10 to reflect annual holding costs between 12% and 120%. The
high values reflect the additional cost of obsolescence and price decay common in many industries.
Thus, the low values are common for products with little value depreciation—around 0.25% per
week—such as power tools, whereas the high values correspond to products with very high value
decay—around 2% per week—found in some electronic components (Guide et al. 2007).
Our experimental design is summarized in Table 2. There are 37 = 2, 187 experimental cells.
This experimental setting is used to study several different facets of our problem, as detailed in the
next subsections.
Table 2: Experimental Design for Numerical Study (pr = 1000,c = 100, α = 0.99, µR = 10)
Factor description Symbol Factor Levels
Total avg. demand as a fraction of avg. returns k 0.8, 1.0, 1.2
Mean demand for parts relative to remanuf. products µdµr 0.5, 1.0, 2.0
CV of demand for remanufactured products CVr 0.1, 0.4, 0.7
Relative remanufacturing cost per unit crpr 0.1, 0.4, 0.7
Relative dismantling cost cdc 0.1, 0.4, 0.7
Relative penalty cost for spare parts (alternative vs. regular) pic 1.5, 3.0, 4.5
Holding cost per month (%) 100hc 1, 5, 10
4.2 Revenue-Management Disposition Policy
We first highlight a few characteristics of the optimal disposition policy. The optimal policy allo-
cates, on average, 28% of the returns to dismantling, with a standard deviation of 16%, a minimum
of 0.1%, and a 95th percentile of 53%. Since v = cr, the remaining returns are remanufactured.
Thus, the share of dismantling is substantial, even though its unit margin pi − cd amounts to only
53%, on average, of the remanufacturing margin pr− cr. This underlines the importance of looking
beyond unit margins in the disposition decision. We further elaborate on this point in the next
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subsection.
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Figure 3: Fraction of Returns Dismantled for Different Levels of Parameter Values
Figure 3 highlights the impact of the various experimental factors on the optimal share of
dismantling. For each factor level (e.g., CVr = 0.1), the graph displays the average value of the
share of dismantling in the optimal disposition across all respective experimental cells. We observe
that the ratio between expected demand for parts and demand for remanufacturing, µdµr , is the main
driver. This is not surprising, since one would expect the share of returns allocated to a specific
channel to increase with the demand in that channel (ceteris paribus). Among the remaining
experimental factors, the CV of demand for remanufacturing appears to have the strongest impact,
and its effect on the share of dismantling is negative. With a higher CV of demand, the risk of losing
sales in the higher-margin remanufacturing channel increases, which motivates a higher allocation
of returns to that channel.
To formalize and quantify these relationships, we performed six single linear regressions. In each
regression, the dependent variable is the fraction of returns dismantled, the independent variable
is the experimental factor of interest, and there are 729 observations. The value of R2 in each
regression provides a simple quantifiable metric for the impact of each factor (Wagner 1995). We
obtained R2 values of 65% and 14% for µdµr and CV, respectively. All other R
2 values are smaller
than 8%
In addition to the ratio between remanufacturing and dismantling volumes, the fractions of
parts demand served through dismantling and the final buy, respectively, also characterizes the
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optimal policy. The final buy largely determines the demand that is left to fill by dismantling. In
our experiments, we found that the optimal policy meets, on average, 54% of demand for spare parts
through dismantling, with a standard deviation of 43%, a minimum of 0.2%, and a 95th percentile
of 94%. Thus, the fraction of demand covered by dismantling is relatively evenly distributed and
the variation is large.
Figure 4 again highlights the impact of the experimental parameters on these outcomes. In
addition to the factors identified in Figure 3, the overall volume of returns k appears as an obvious
driver—the optimal policy dismantles more when more returns are available. Regression analysis
yielded R2 values of 45%, 22%, and 14% for k, CVr, and
µd
µr
, respectively, and values smaller than
6% for all remaining factors.
The results in Figure 4 also give an indication of the optimal final-buy quantities in the different
scenarios. The demand volume not served through dismantling essentially has to be covered by the
final buy. In addition, we also have the emergency supply, but this volume is small, in general.
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Figure 4: Fraction of Parts Demand Met from Dismantling for Different Levels of Parameter Values
4.3 Value of Dismantling
We now proceed to compare our revenue-management based disposition policy with other policies.
As discussed in Sections 1 and 2, a common approach in practice is to rank dispositions by unit
margin and to allocate returns depending on their quality condition to the highest-ranked option
that is technically feasible. In our case, this would mean remanufacturing all returned units. (Recall
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that we only consider high-quality returns.) Demand for parts is then met solely with inventory
from the final buy plus potential emergency supplies.
We refer to this policy as ‘no dismantling’ and denote its expected discounted profit through
the planning horizon by V NDT ; this value is found by solving the MDP (4)-(5) with Qd,t = 0 and
Qrt = R for all t (in our experiments, v = cr). Thus, the only decision in the no-dismantling
case is the quantity of the final buy INDT at time t = T . We define the value of dismantling as
∆ND(V ∗) = 100%V
∗
T−V NDT
V ∗T
, which is the profit deterioration from not using the dismantling option.
Using the experimental design of Table 2, the mean value of dismantling is 20% (median 10%),
with a standard deviation of 30%, a minimum value of 0% and a 95th percentile of 85%. Thus, the
value of dismantling is significant, and varies widely across our experimental design. This is in line
with the results of Section 4.2: Not only does the optimal policy recommend dismantling a large
fraction of the returns for spare parts, it also achieves significant financial benefits by doing so.
The differences between the policies regarding dismantling volumes are also mirrored in the
corresponding final-buy quantities. Define −∆ND(IT ) as the relative inventory increase at the
beginning of planning horizon when moving from the optimal policy to a no-dismantling policy.
The median inventory increase is 127%, with a mean value of 290%. This drastically highlights one
of the tangible benefits of dismantling, which is a very significant reduction in inventory held for
spare parts. Note that the distribution of ∆ND(IT ) is highly right skewed due to the many cases
where the firm carries little or no inventory of spare parts in the optimal policy, due to a relative
abundance of returns available for dismantling.
To gain insight into the large variations in the value of dismantling, we again compute averages
for each factor level. The results are shown in Figure 5. As in Figure 3, the ratio between
µd/µr turns out to have the strongest impact (R2=30%). Thus, relatively higher expected demand
for parts results in a higher dismantling volume and also in a higher financial contribution of
dismantling. In addition, the remanufacturing cost also strongly influences the value of dismantling
(R2=21%). Higher remanufacturing costs reduces the margin of remanufacturing and therefore
makes dismantling more attractive.
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Figure 5: Value of Dismantling for Different Levels of Parameter Values
The remaining experimental factors appear to have a lower impact in Figure 5 (all R2 < 3%).
Qualitatively, we observe that the value of dismantling increases for higher holding cost hc , higher
return volume k, higher penalty cost pic , lower variability of demand for remanufactured products
CVr, and lower dismantling cost cdc . These outcomes largely match those regarding the dismantling
fraction in Figure 3. It is worth noting the effect of the holding cost rate. A higher value of hc
renders the final buy of spare parts more expensive and therefore makes dismantling a relatively
more attractive source for spare parts. While Figure 3 shows that this effect results in only a
relatively minor increase of the dismantling volume, Figure 5 shows that the financial value of
dismantling increases substantially.
To summarize, ignoring the dismantling option reduces profit by an average of 20% (median
value of 10%), and inflates spare parts inventory by a median value of 127%. Further, the average
value of dismantling can be significantly higher if the demand for spare parts is high (43%), the
remanufacturing cost is high (41%), and the holding cost is high (26%). Note that these outcomes
are based on the assumption of riskless remanufacturing (i.e. v = cr). A lower salvage value of
remanufactured units is likely to strengthen the importance of dismantling even further.
23
4.4 Value of Optimal Allocation
We complement the results of the previous section by evaluating another common heuristic. In
the case of shortages, many firms allocate available supply to customer orders proportional to their
order volumes. This practice has been widely discussed in studies on the bullwhip effect (see e.g.
Lee et al., 1997). Inderfurth et al. (2001) apply this linear allocation rule to the disposition decision
in a closed-loop supply chain.
We assess the performance of such a linear allocation through a disposition policy that allocates
returns to remanufacturing and dismantling proportionally to their respective mean demands, net
of inventory. Specifically, given R returns at the beginning of period t, the firm sets Qr,t =
µr
µr+max(µd−It/t,0)R and Qd,t = R−Qr,t. The second term in the denominator of Qr,t is the expected
demand for parts net of inventory. Denote the expected discounted profit through the planning
horizon for using this mean demand allocation (MDA) heuristic by VMDAT . Further denote the
value of optimal allocation by ∆MDA(V ∗) = 100%V
∗
T−VMDAT
V ∗T
, which is the profit deterioration of
using the MDA heuristic relative to the optimal policy.
Using the experimental design of Table 2, the average value of optimal allocation ∆MDA(V ∗)
is 3.8%, with a median value of 3%, a standard deviation of 3.6%, a minimum value of 0.1% and a
95th percentile of 9.2%. Thus, a simple allocation policy based on mean demands net of inventory
performs reasonably well in many cases. This is good news from a managerial perspective, since
this allocation rule is much simpler than the optimal allocation, which is based on detailed dynamic
optimization, even for the case of a single recoverable part per return.
As for the ND policy, we also consider the effect of the MDA rule on inventories. Define
∆MDA(IT ) to be the increase of the optimal final buy, and thus of the initial inventory of parts,
by using the MDA heuristic vis-a-vis the optimal disposition. The average inventory increase
∆MDA(IT ) is 44%, and the median increase is 22%, which is a significant value but not nearly as
high as in the ND case.
At first sight, it may be surprising that the MDA rule implies higher inventories than the optimal
policy. The reason is that the MDA rule does not consider cost effects in its allocation. In the case
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of low inventories, this may result in expensive out-of-stocks of parts. To prevent this situation,
the MDA uses a larger final buy, but at the expense of higher inventories. Consequently, the MDA
policy dismantles 16% less returns on average than the optimal policy, with a 95th percentile of
60%. We note, however, that in 21% of the scenarios the MDA policy sets lower inventories and
dismantles more than the optimal policy. These are cases where the final buy for the optimal policy
is high: i.e. scarce returns, remanufacturing economically more attractive relative to dismantling,
and low holding costs.
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Figure 6: Value of Optimal Allocation for Different Levels of Parameter Values
Similar to the previous sections, we also performed an analysis to gain insights into which
factors most influence the value of optimal allocation; the results are shown in Figure 6. The same
factors as in the ND case stand out in explaining ∆MDA(V ∗): mean parts demand relative to
remanufacturing µdµr (R
2=19%), remanufacturing cost crc (R
2=10%), and to a less extent holding
cost hc (R
2=4%).
To summarize, a simple linear allocation of returns based on mean demands (net of inventory)
performs relatively well, with an optimality gap of 3.8% on average. This supports the practical
use of this rule. We note, however, that the performance of the MDA rule is dependent on an
appropriate adjustment of the final buy. This turns the disposition problem into an inventory
management problem. We address this interplay in more detail in the following subsection.
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4.5 Value of Coordination between Final Buy and Dismantling
Our optimal policy assumes the final buy quantity I∗T takes into account the forecast for future
returns, along with an optimal allocation of returns between dismantling and remanufacturing. This
assumes a perfect coordination between a purchasing manager, who is responsible for the supply
of a particular part, and the reverse supply chain manager, who is responsible for forecasting and
processing returns. It has been our experience that in many firms (e.g., IBM, HP, Pitney Bowes)
these two managers typically do not belong to the same organizational unit. In particular, final
buy decisions for parts are frequently made based on a forecast of demand during the remaining
lifetime and service period, without taking into account the potential supply of parts from used
units (Cattani and Souza 2003). Thus, the “perfect coordination” assumed by the optimal policy
may be unrealistic. We now investigate the value of coordination: What is the profit deterioration
of having the final buy decision made without consideration of a possible supply of parts from
dismantling in the future? The final buy quantity without consideration of future dismantling is
INDT . Once that decision is made, however, the firm makes the optimal allocation decision between
dismantling and remanufacturing as returns arrive. Thus, the value of dismantling is given by
∆NC(V ∗) = 100%V
∗
T (I
∗
T )−V ∗T (INDT )
V ∗T (I
∗
T )
.
Using the experimental design of Table 2, the average value of coordination ∆NC(V ∗) is 14.3%,
with a median value of 5.7%, a standard deviation of 23%, a minimum value of 0% and a 95th
percentile of 67%. Thus, accounting for the dismantling option in the final buy has the potential
to significantly improve profits. An analysis similar to the one in Section 4.3 reveals a very similar
picture to that of Figure 5, so we omit it for brevity. Thus, the drivers of the value of coordination
are the same as those of the value of dismantling: mean part demand relative to remanufacturing
demand µdµR , the remanufacturing cost per unit
cr
pr
, and to a less extent hc .
To assess these results it is useful to put the value of coordination into another perspective. To
this end, we express the value of coordination as the fraction of the dismantling benefit that can be
attributed to coordination. This fraction can be expressed as ∆˜NC(V ∗) = 100% V
∗
T (I
∗
T )−V ∗T (INDT )
V ∗T (I
∗
T )−V NDT (INDT )
.
The quantity in the numerator is the dismantling benefit attributable to coordination, whereas
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the denominator represents the total dismantling benefit. The average value of ∆˜NC(V ∗) is 61%,
indicating that 61% of the dismantling benefit can be attributed to coordination between the final
buy decision and the processing of returns at the reverse supply chain. Put differently, only 39%
of the dismantling benefit can be achieved without coordination between the forward and reverse
chains.
An analysis of the factors driving this number is shown in Figure 7; it can be seen that all param-
eters are roughly equally important in explaining this result, so that the fraction of the dismantling
benefit achieved through coordination is high in most scenarios. This result strongly points to the
need for coordinating reverse and forward supply chains to achieve maximal profitability.
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Figure 7: Value of Coordination for Different Levels of Parameter Values
5 Conclusion and Managerial Implications
In this paper, we propose a revenue management perspective to the problem of making optimal
disposition decisions for product returns in a closed-loop supply chain. Motivated by a case study
of IBM, we consider two disposition alternatives, namely remanufacturing and dismantling for
spare parts. We describe how disposition decisions for product returns have typically been made
based solely on unit profit margins. We argue that the disposition problem is actually a revenue-
management problem and that the optimal decision should balance unit margins and demand
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uncertainty. The problem resembles the classical airline revenue management problem of allocating
seats between the uncertain demand of future higher margin customers with the demand from the
lower margin, but more certain, customers. A key difference is that in our scenario, the “seats”—
product returns—are uncertain each period, and there are alternative means of meeting demand for
the low margin alternative (spare parts), which involve buying a large quantity of parts inventory
(final-buy) in advance of the allocation decisions.
We present a single and a multi-period optimization model of the disposition problem. The
single period model provides insights into the nature of the allocation decision for a given number
of returns. We show that the optimal allocation balances the expected marginal profits of remanu-
facturing and dismantling. Our multi-period model links the disposition of returns to the final buy
decision for spare parts at the beginning of the planning horizon, and takes into account uncertainty
in the distribution of returns. We show that the optimal solution has the same structure as the
single period model, although its computation is more complex.
We then study, numerically, the expected profit increase of using our revenue management
approach versus the current practice of ranking disposition alternatives by unit margins. We
show that the value of dismantling is significant with a 20% profit increase on average, despite its
lower unit margins which amounts to 53% of the remanufacturing margin, on average. We further
show that about 60% of the dismantling benefits can be attributed to the coordination between the
forward chain (final-buy decision) and the reverse chain (optimal allocation of returns), quantifying
the importance of integrating the decision making of the forward and reverse supply chains. Because
of the computational complexity of the optimal policy, we show that in an appropriately coordinated
chain, a simple allocation heuristic based on the mean demand rates performs reasonably well,
yielding a moderate profit decrease of 4% on average compared to the optimal allocation solution.
Our results have clear implications for the management of closed-loop supply chains. They
show that a revenue-management approach to the disposition of returns can significantly enhance
profitability. Incorporating additional disposition options can be very valuable, even if they have
lower unit margins than current options. This should encourage managers to explore new product
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recovery alternatives. Harvesting of spare parts can be a particularly attractive option, given the
relatively long life cycles of parts. However, careful coordination between the forward and reverse
supply chain decisions is indispensable for reaping these benefits. In our experience, few companies
to date have reached this level of integration. Our message is that the current reactive approach
to the reverse supply chain misses out on significant opportunities.
Our analysis makes a number of assumptions specific to the recovery system considered here. To
further the insight into the role of the disposition decision in closed-loop supply chains, extensions to
other settings would be valuable. This includes the study of dispositions other than remanufacturing
and dismantling. It also includes the incorporation of flexible pricing in the disposition decision.
Another very relevant question for future research is how to achieve coordination concerning the
disposition of returns when decisions pertaining to the forward and the reverse supply chain are
taken by different organizational units.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
The objective function (2) is jointly concave in Qr and Qd because ∂
2Π
∂Q2r
= −(pr − v)fr(Qr) ≤ 0,
∂2Π
∂Q2d
= −∑i pida2i f id(aiQd) ≤ 0, and ∂2Π∂Qd∂Qr = 0; thus the Hessian is negative definite. Denoting by
L(Qd, Qr, λR, λd, λr) the Lagrangian of this problem, then the KKT conditions ∂L∂Qi = 0, i ∈ {r, d};
λR(R − Qr − Qd) = 0, λdQd = 0, λrQr = 0 and λR, λd, λr ≥ 0 are necessary and sufficient for
optimality, because the constraint set is a convex set (both variables Qr and Qd are bounded by R
and 0, and there is only a linear constraint). The Lagrangian for this problem is:
L(Qd, Qr, λR, λd, λr) = (pr − v)
(
Qr −
∫ Qr
0
Fr(u)du
)
+ (v − cr)Qr
−
∑
i
pii
(
µi − aiQd +
∫ aiQd
0
Fd(u)du
)
− cdQd
+λR(R−Qr −Qd) + λdQd + λrQr.
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The first order conditions result in
∂L
∂Qr
= −λR + λr + v − cr + (pr − v) (1− Fr(Qr)) = 0 (9)
∂L
∂Qd
= −λR + λd − cd +
∑
i
piiai
(
1− F id(aiQd)
)
= 0 (10)
Isolating λR from (9) and (10), we obtain:
λr + (pr − v) (1− Fr(Qr)) + v − cr = λd +
∑
i
piiai
(
1− F id(aiQd)
)− cd. (11)
We have two cases to consider:
1. The constraint Qd +Qr = R is binding. In this case, Qr = R−Qd, and thus (11) becomes:
(pr − v) (1− Fr(R−Qd)) + v − cr −
∑
i
piiai
(
1− F id(ai(Qd))
)− cd = λr − λd. (12)
If the lefthand side of (12) is strictly positive, then λr > 0 and, by complementary slackness,
Qr = 0 and thus Qd = R. Conversely, a strictly negative lefthand side of (12) implies Qr = R
and Qd = 0. Finally, if both Qd and Qr are strictly positive, then λr = λd = 0 and Qˆd defined
in Lemma 1 solves (12). This solution can be found using a simple line-search algorithm.
2. The constraint Qd+Qr = R is not binding. In this case, by complementary slackness, λR = 0.
For λr = 0, Q˜r defined in Lemma 1 solves (9), otherwise Qr = 0. The same argument applies
for Qd.
Proof of Corollary 1
The result follows as a special case of Lemma 1. For deterministic and equal demand for parts, we
have Πd(Q) = pi − cd for Q ≤ dd and 0 otherwise. Therefore Q˜d = dd > 0 and Qˇr = R− Qˆd.
Proof of Corollary 2
For v = cr the expected profit (2) is non-decreasing in Qr. For any solution (Q∗d, Q
∗
r) with Q
∗
r+Q
∗
d <
R the disposition decision (Q∗d, R−Q∗d) is therefore also optimal.
Proof of Theorem 1
We show Properties (i)-(iii) by induction. For t = 0 (i) holds since V0 ≡ 0 by definition. Assume now
that (i) holds for t− 1. We first show that this implies Properties (ii) and (iii) for t. Subsequently,
we show that (i) also holds for t.
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We have ∂
2Πt
∂Q2d,t
= ∂
2Πt
∂I2t
= ∂
2Πt
∂Qd,t∂It
= −(h + pi)fdt(It + Qd,t) ≤ 0, ∂2Πt∂Q2r,t = −(pr − v)frt ≤ 0, and
∂2Πt
∂Qd,tQr,t
= ∂
2Πt
∂It∂Qr,t
= 0. Therefore, the current-period expected profit r is jointly concave in It, Qd,t
and Qr,t. The expected discounted future profits are independent of Qr,t and jointly concave in It
and Qd,t due to the concavity of Vt−1. This shows (ii) for t.
The proof of (iii) is identical to the one of Lemma 1, due to the concavity property established
in (ii). Note that Πdt(I,Q) = ∂Wt∂Qd,t (I,Q, c) and Πr =
∂Wt
∂Qr,t
(I, c, R−Q) for any arbitrary value of c.
It remains to be shown that (i) holds for t. It suffices to show that concavity holds for any
given value of Rt, which implies that it also holds in expectation. For given Rt the concavity of
maxQd,t+Qr,t≤RWt(I,Qd,t, Qr,t) in I follows from the concavity of Wt shown in (ii) and from the
fact that the set of feasible actions Qd,t and Qr,t is convex and independent of I.
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